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ABSTRACT 
Two experiments are described that investigate the effects of attention in moderating 
evaluative conditioning (EC) effects in a picture-picture paradigm in which previously 
discovered experimental artifacts (e.g. Field & Davey, 1999) were overcome by 
counterbalancing conditioned stimuli (CSs) and unconditioned stimuli (USs) across 
participants. Conditioned responses for individuals who had attention enhanced were compared 
against a control group and groups for whom attention was impeded using a distracter task. In 
a second Experiment the effects of attention were dissociated from those of contingency 
awareness by using backward masked US presentations. The results of these experiments 
indicate that although associative EC effects may not be disrupted by a lack of contingency 
awareness, attention is an important factor in establishing conditioning. These results shed 
some light onto the possible boundary conditions that could explain past inconsistencies in 
obtaining EC effects in the visual paradigm. 
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DISSOCIATING THE EFFECTS OF ATTENTION AND 
CONTINGENCY AWARENESS ON EVALUATIVE 
CONDITIONING EFFECTS IN THE VISUAL PARADIGM 
Evaluative conditioning (EC) is a process by which neutral stimuli acquire affect through 
contiguous pairing with a stimulus that already evokes an emotional response. In 
conditioning terms, the affectively neutral stimulus is the conditioned stimulus (CS) and is 
paired with either a liked or disliked unconditioned stimulus (US), resulting in the CS 
evoking a response congruent with the US with which it was paired (see De Houwer, 
Thomas & Baeyens, 2001, for a review). EC has been an elusive and controversial 
phenomenon with Stevenson, Boakes and Wilson (2000), and Lovibond and Shanks (2002) 
recently noting that EC experiments using visual stimuli had come under considerable 
criticism. The controversy surrounding EC stems from failures to obtain the basic effect 
(e.g. Field, Lascelles & Davey, 2003; Rozin, Wrzesniewski & Byrnes, 1998; Field and 
Davey, 1999; Field, 1997); demonstrations that EC effects can be elicited when 
participants have never been exposed to CS-US presentations, which have illustrated that 
EC effects can emerge from non-associative processes (Field & Davey, 1997, 1999); and 
criticisms that some early research could not rule out such non-associative processes 
because of a failure to counterbalance CSs and USs (Shanks & Dickinson, 1990) or to use 
between-group controls in which participants are exposed to CSs and USs, but not in 
contingent pairings (Davey, 1994; Field & Davey, 1998, 1999). 
Notwithstanding these problems, EC is intriguing theoretically because, despite being a 
paradigmatic example of classical conditioning, it appears prima facie to have several 
unusual characteristics; the two most important being that unlike conventional autonomic 
conditioning in humans, EC can occur without participants possessing awareness of the 
learning contingencies involved (Baeyens, Eelen & Van den Bergh, 1990) and responses 
acquired through EC appear to be resistant to extinction (Baeyens, Crombez, Van den 
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Bergh & Eelen, 1988; Diaz, Ruiz & Baeyens, this issue). Conditioning without contingency 
awareness is particularly important theoretically because, as Lovibond and Shanks (2002) 
point out, it rarely—if ever—occurs in autonomic conditioning. Lovibond and Shanks 
distinguish single process models, in which propositional learning causes contingency 
awareness which in turn causes the conditioned response, from dual-process models, in 
which propositional learning causes contingency awareness, but conditioned responding is 
caused by some nonpropositional system (so contingency awareness and learning need not 
correlate). If EC can occur without awareness then a dual process model is implied—EC 
would be a nonpropositional learning process. One further inference might, therefore, be 
that EC is a qualitatively distinct form of Pavlovian learning. Indeed, Baeyens, Eelen and 
Crombez (1995) and Baeyens and De Houwer (1995) suggest that EC is a form of learning 
in which CS-US associations are merely referential connections between stimuli: so, 
according to Baeyens et al. (1995), unlike Pavlovian learning it is not critical that the CS be 
accompanied by a genuine expectancy that the US will shortly follow. 
However, the true value of work into EC using visual stimuli has been diminished by the 
criticisms alluded to earlier. Fortunately, some progress has been made in the visual 
domain; for example, Diaz et al. (this issue) incorporated between-group controls and 
replicated the finding that conditioned evaluative responses were resistant to extinction; 
Field (2003) has likewise shown evaluative conditioning to visual stimuli compared to such 
controls. To date though, few studies using visual stimuli have used the counterbalanced 
CS-US allocations suggested by Shanks & Dickinson (1990). Paired with the ubiquitous 
reports of failures to replicate EC effects in a variety of laboratories (Field & Davey, 1999; 
Rozin et al., 1998; Field et al., 2003), the cloud of doubt hanging over EC has still yet to 
fully disperse. The apparent fragility of the EC phenomenon has led some (Rozin et 
al.,1998; De Houwer et al., 2000, 2001) to allude to the possibility of boundary conditions 
that moderate conditioned responding, however, likely moderator variables have yet to be 
proposed or tested empirically. One such boundary condition could be attention. 
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In general terms, dividing attention seems to attenuate learning: Nissen and Bullemer 
(1987) demonstrated that under dual task conditions participants could not learn a 
repeating sequence (as measured by the serial reaction time task, which they characterise 
as associative learning)—see also Shanks and Channon (2002). In addition, although 
divided attention did reduce conscious awareness of the sequence being learnt, Nissen and 
Bullemer concluded that it was not the lack of awareness that caused the lack of learning: 
amnesic patients could learn the sequence despite having no awareness of it (see also 
Reber & Squire, 1994, 1998).  
Attention might also have a more specific role to play. The Rescorla-Wagner model (1972) 
formalises the idea that associations are formed between cues and surprising outcomes. 
This model famously incorporates a term representing a cue’s individual associability, 
which represents an individual learning rate that the model acknowledges stems from 
differential attention. Mackintosh (1975), in a seminal paper, extended these ideas to 
suggest that the attention devoted to a given cue is a function of its importance in 
predicting an outcome: that is, animals will attend to relevant stimuli at the expense of not 
attending to irrelevant ones. Both models formalise learning in terms of a change in the 
association weights (associative strength) of a CS. Kruschke (2001) has followed up 
Mackintosh’s ideas by proposing an attentional system involved in learning that has two 
goals: the first is to implement the assumption that any CS should receive some attention, 
and the second is to decide how attention should be distributed over multiple CSs. 
Kahneman’s (1973) suggestion that attentional resources are finite is upheld in this model 
such that increased attention to one CS necessarily implies less attention to another. The 
system receives feedback and shifts attention in such a way as to reduce error, these shifts 
in attention lead to changes in the association weights (of the CSs), which themselves act 
to reduce the error in learning.  
Interestingly, these attentional models provide explanations of failures to learn such as 
blocking (in which an organism fails to acquire a conditioned response to a stimulus, A, if it 
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is presented in compound with another stimulus, B, that already predicts the US, Kamin, 
1969) and latent inhibition (in which pre-exposure to a stimulus retards subsequent 
learning of a conditioned response to that stimulus during conditioning). Blocking, for 
example, results from learning not to attend to the stimulus A (Mackintosh, 1975) and has 
garnered empirical support (Krushke & Blair, 2000) and latent inhibition can be explained 
in terms of inattention (Kruschke, 2001). Lubow and Gerwitz (1995), in a review of latent 
inhibition, report that latent inhibition is strongest when a masking task is presented during 
pre-exposure; however, if this task is absent or is too difficult then latent inhibition will be 
small or non-existent. Kruschke (2001) argues that these results can be explained in terms 
of attentional load: only when the pre-exposed cue competes with the masking task for 
attention will subsequent latent inhibition occur. If the masking task is too difficult then it 
requires full attention and so none is available for the pre-exposed stimulus when it 
appears alongside the task. 
The importance of both blocking and latent inhibition to failures to obtain EC is that they 
involve failures to learn. Learning fails because of a CS attracting insufficient attention. 
Based on this, one general explanation of the inconsistencies in EC research could, 
therefore, be that in some experiments the CSs are sufficiently attention-grabbing for 
learning to occur, whereas in others learning fails because the CSs do not attract attention. 
Given that divided attention reduces awareness of what is being learnt (see Nissen & 
Bullemer, 1987, above), attention may also go some way to explaining inconsistent 
findings with regard to contingency awareness and EC. There is evidence that contingency 
awareness facilitates conditioning, does not influence learning one way or another, and 
impedes learning (see Field, 2000 and 2001a for reviews). Contingency awareness has 
been defined (at least at the operational level) variously as the knowledge that a particular 
CS precedes a particular US (Field, 2000; Baeyens et al., 1990 for example), or that a 
particular CS precedes a US that evokes a particular emotional response (e.g. Baeyens et 
al., 1990). If, as Mackintosh (1975) and Rescorla-Wagner (1972) suggest, attention to a 
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CS increases the strength of the associative connection between that CS and its US, then 
this may well have a knock on effect in terms of contingency awareness. Nevertheless, it is 
conceivable that contingency awareness can be dissociated from attention: Nissen and 
Bullemer ‘emphasize the importance of distinguishing between attending to the task itself 
and being aware of information carried by the task’ (p. 29).  
The current study looks at these issues by manipulating general aspects of attention in an 
EC task using visual stimuli. In addition to this, it takes the novel step of using fully 
counterbalanced CS-US allocations to eliminate the artefact described by Field and Davey 
(1999) and uses comparison groups in which CSs and USs cannot be associated. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In the first experiment an attempt was made to manipulate the attentional load during a 
visual EC task. This is comparable to the dual task conditions described by Nissen and 
Bullemer and seeks to reduce the attention paid to the task itself. It is predicted that in 
dual task conditions, EC will be attenuated. In addition, contingency awareness should be 
reduced in the dual-task condition, but based on other associative learning tasks (like 
sequence learning) it should be attention to the task, and not awareness of the 
contingencies that attenuates learning.   
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-six paid volunteers were used as participants (32 per condition) and were tested 
individually.  Their ages ranged from 19 to 55 years. The majority (76) were students from 
various disciplines at Sussex University and the remaining 20 were members of the general 
public.  In the awareness-enhanced condition, 10 were male, 22 were female, 6 were 
members of the general public and the mean age of the group was 22.41 (SD = 5.10). In 
the distraction condition, 10 were male, 22 were female, 8 were members of the general 
9 
public and the mean age of the group was 28.00 (SD = 11.29). In the control condition 11 
were male, 21 were female, 6 were members of the general public and the mean age of 
the group was 23.50 (SD = 3.51). 
Stimuli 
Fifty colour photographs were taken from the International Affective Picture System CD-
ROM (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1997a), which contains a set of emotional stimuli with 
normative affective ratings collected over 10 years (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1997b). The 
pictures chosen for this study had received similar ratings from both genders (and were, 
therefore, not gender specific) and had elicited either neutral, very positive or very 
negative pleasure ratings. Four pictures were chosen as CSs based on them having 
completely neutral IAPS ratings (from Lang et al., 1997b). The USs consisted of two 
pictures that had very positive IAPS ratings and two that had very negative IAPS ratings. A 
list of CS and US pictures and their IAPS ratings are in Appendix A. The remaining 42 
pictures contained a range of positive, negative and neutral pictures. 
To avoid the artefact described by Field and Davey (1999), CSs were allocated to USs using 
a Latin-square counterbalancing order. There were four different CS-US allocations 
ensuring that each CS was paired with all four USs across participants.  
Apparatus 
The experiment was run on a Pentium PC using custom written computer software: Ectests 
version 1.2 (Stevens, Lascelles, Field, Matthias, Siddens-Corby & Ives, 1999). The 
experimental cubicle contained a table, a chair and the computer, monitor and mouse. 
Procedure 
Before the experiment, participants were randomly allocated to one of three groups 
(attention-enhanced, distraction, BSB control) that differed in the instructions that they 
received (see stage 2 below).  
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All participants were initially given written instructions. Once the experimenter was 
satisfied that the instructions had been understood and that the participant was able to use 
the mouse to operate the on-screen rating scale, the participant was left alone in the room 
to complete the experiment.  The experiment consisted of four stages, with instructions 
appearing on the screen before each stage to remind the participant of what to do. 
Stage 1: Baseline Assessment (pre-conditioning) 
In this stage, the 50 IAPS photographs were randomly presented to participants. Each 
picture appeared in the centre of the computer screen, directly above a rating scale. The 
scale ranged from –100 (disliked) through 0 (neutral) to +100 (liked), in intervals of five. 
Using the mouse, a pointer on the scale could be dragged along the scale to the point that 
indicated the participant’s feelings towards the picture.  Below the scale, a screen button 
displayed the value indicated by the pointer. Participants moved the pointer until satisfied 
with their rating, after which they clicked on the on-screen button to proceed to the next 
picture. This encouraged participants to pay attention to the rating they had given a 
particular picture. It was emphasized to participants that they should rely on their 
spontaneous, instinctive reaction to the picture. The ratings given at this stage were the 
pre-conditioning ratings. 
Stage 2: Acquisition 
Attention-enhanced and distraction groups received the same stimulus presentation 
schedule at this stage. The only difference between the groups was in the alleged aim of 
the experiment conveyed by the instructions. All participants were told to attend carefully 
to a series of pictures on the screen. However, the attention-enhanced group was told that 
the experiment examined memory and was asked to try to memorise the order of the 
pictures. The distraction group was led to believe the experiment was investigating 
multitasking and was correspondingly instructed to count backwards from 300, aloud, in 
intervals of 3 for the duration of the stage. (This task was intended to reduce attention to 
the CS-US contingencies). The instructions stressed the importance of both attending to 
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the screen and counting backwards. Both groups were asked to think about how the 
pictures made them feel.  
During this stage, each participant saw four CS-US pairings: two CSs paired with positive 
USs (Neutral-Like, N-L) and two CSs paired with disliked USs (Neutral-Dislike, N-D). Each 
CS-US pairing was presented 10 times, and the presentation order was randomised with 
the restriction that no CS-US pairing could appear consecutively more than twice. Each 
stimulus appeared for 1s, the interval between the CS and US (the trace interval) was set 
at 100ms, and the interval between CS-US pairs (the inter-trial-interval, ITI) was 4s. The 
trace interval was considerably shorter than the intervals used in early EC studies (e.g. 
Baeyens et al., 1988 and 1990). 
The BSB control group were told to attend carefully to a series of pictures on the screen 
and to think about how the pictures made them feel. They were not told to memorise the 
order of pictures or asked to do the distracter task. The pictures were then presented in a 
BSB control procedure (Field, 1996, 1997) in which CSs and USs were selected and 
matched together using the same counterbalancing schedule as in the two experimental 
groups. However, during conditioning the CSs and USs were not presented in a contiguous 
or contingent pattern. Instead, participants saw 5 pairings of a stimulus with itself (so 
participants saw each stimulus presented 10 times—as in the experimental conditions), 
using the same timing parameters as the experimental conditions. Thus, a stimulus 
appeared for 1s, followed by a blank screen for 100ms, followed by the same stimulus 
presented for 1s, followed by a blank screen for 4s, and so on until that stimulus had 
appeared 10 times. This set of self-presentations can be thought of as a block of pairings; 
because there were four different CS-US pairs in the experimental conditions, this control 
condition contained four CS blocks and four US blocks. 
Half of the participants saw the four CS blocks presented in random order followed by the 
four US blocks, also in random order, and half saw the US blocks before the CS blocks. 
Keeping the CS blocks separate from the US blocks ensured that participants never saw a 
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CS appearing contingently with a US. By randomising the presentation order of the blocks 
the possibility that participants could detect the US that corresponded to a CS was 
eliminated: because, for example, a CS might appear as the first CS-block, whereas the 
corresponding US might appear as the third US-block presented. So, even if participants 
were aware that there were CS-US pairings, which is unlikely, it is improbable that they 
could determine exactly which CS was assigned to which US. If no conditioning effects are 
observed in this condition, then nonassociative accounts of the effects observed in the 
experimental condition can be ruled out. 
Stage 3: Postacquisition Assessment (post-conditioning) 
Participants were informed that they would be presented with another set of photographs, 
and that they must rate each one along a rating scale to indicate the degree to which they 
liked, disliked or felt neutral about it. The same 50 pictures as in stage one were shown in 
random order and re-rated. The ratings in this stage are the post-conditioning ratings. 
Stage 4: Measurement of Contingency Awareness. 
Manipulations to attention will invariably enhance or hinder contingency awareness and 
these effects need to be examined, so three measures of contingency awareness were used 
in this stage in counterbalanced order across participants. The first two were the so-called 
strong and weak measures used in much of the EC literature (e.g. Baeyens et al. 1988, 
1989a, 1990, 1992; Hammerl & Grabitz, 1993) and the third was the recognition measure 
described by Field (2000). This stage of the experiment typically took participants 1-3 
minutes to complete. 
Strong Measure: This measure of contingency awareness is so called because it measures 
precise knowledge of contingencies: participants must know exactly which US was paired 
with which CS. In this procedure one randomly selected CS appeared on the left side of the 
computer screen and all four USs appeared on the right (in random positions). Participants 
were asked to click on the picture on the right that they believed always followed the 
picture on the left during stage two of the experiment. After selecting a picture, four 
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buttons (Completely Sure, Rather Sure, Rather Unsure, and Completely Unsure) appeared 
at the bottom of the screen for participants to indicate their confidence in their decision. 
Following this selection, one of the remaining CSs appeared on the left of the screen, and 
the four USs appeared on the right (in a different random position). The participant 
repeated the selection process until a US had been selected for each of the four CSs. 
Weak Measure: This procedure measures knowledge of only the valence of the US paired 
with a CS, and as such is considered weak. In this measure, one randomly selected CS 
appeared in the centre of the screen above three on-screen buttons (Liked, Disliked, and 
Neutral). Participants used these buttons to indicate whether they believed the picture (CS) 
had been followed by a picture that they liked, disliked or felt neutral about during stage 
two of the experiment. Following this choice, participants indicated their confidence in the 
decision using one of four on-screen buttons (Completely Sure, Rather Sure, Rather 
Unsure, and Completely Unsure). This process was repeated for the three remaining CSs. 
Recognition Measure: This measure of awareness is described by Field (2000) and required 
participants to discriminate actual CS-US pairings from decoy pairings in which the US is 
replaced with a picture from stage one that had the same valence as the US that was 
actually used. These decoy USs appeared in the baseline phase, but not in the acquisition 
stage. Participants saw eight CS-US pairs in random order (four actual CS-US pairings and 
four decoy pairings). Underneath each CS-US pair there were three on-screen buttons 
labelled Remember, Know, and No. For each pair of pictures participants were asked 
whether the pair of pictures had always appeared together (sequentially) during stage two 
of the experiment. Participants could respond that they (1) actually remembered seeing 
the pairing (remember), (2) had a feeling that they had seen the pairing (know), or (3) 
definitely did not see the pairing during stage two (no).  
Criteria for Contingency Awareness: Participants were deemed to be aware of a given 
contingency if they met the following criteria. For the strong measure, participants had to 
correctly identified the US with which a CS was paired and be either completely or rather 
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sure of their answer. For the weak measure, participants had to correctly identified the 
valence of the US with which a CS was paired and be either completely or rather sure of 
their answer. For the recognition measure, two conditions had to be met: participants had 
to correctly recognised the actual contingency (either by indicating that they remembered 
seeing it, or had a feeling that they had seen it) and also had to indicate that they had not 
seen the relevant decoy pairing.  
For group analysis, a participant was classified as contingency aware for a given measure if 
they were aware of 2 or more of the 4 contingencies based on the relevant criteria for the 
measure. This criterion is based on the fact that for all three measures, by guessing alone, 
a participant should only be deemed aware of 0 or 1 of the four contingencies (to the 
nearest contingency). The final decision as to whether a participant was classified as aware 
was based on the majority decision of the three awareness measures: if two or more of the 
measures classified the participant as aware then that individual was deemed aware of the 
contingencies, if two or more of the measures classified a participant as unaware then that 
person was classified as unaware. 
Results 
All statistical tests used a cut-off point of p = 0.05 for significance and, where relevant, 
effect sizes are reported as Pearson’s r. 
Awareness Measures 
In the attention-enhanced condition all 32 participants were classified as contingency 
aware based on the criteria above. In the distraction condition 10 participants were 
deemed unaware; the remainder were contingency aware. For the analysis, the distracter 
condition was broken down into contingency aware and contingency unaware sub-groups.  
US Ratings 
The liked USs were rated positively in the attention-enhanced group (M = 49.87, SE = 
6.49), the distraction group (M = 45.00, SE = 10.76), and the BSB control (M = 55.20, SE 
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= 6.09). The disliked USs were rated very negatively in the attention enhanced group (M = 
−82.73, SE = 4.75), the distraction group (M = −66.56, SE = 7.88) and the BSB control (M 
= –78.60, SE = 4.46). Using a probability of .05, a three-way 4 (group: attention-
enhanced, distraction (aware), distraction (unaware) or BSB control) × 2 (US type: liked or 
disliked) × 2 (picture: picture 1 or picture 2) ANOVA on the US ratings revealed a highly 
significant main effect of US type, F(1, 66) = 479.69, r = .94 but no other significant main 
effects or interactions. These results indicate that liked USs were rated significantly more 
positively than disliked USs across all three groups. 
CS Ratings 
One consideration with using a counterbalanced design is that it is assumed that CSs 
(neutral pictures) that are selected based on their IAPS ratings (Lang et al., 1997b) are 
actually perceived as neutral by the participants in the experiment. It also assumes that 
the US pictures are perceived as liked and disliked (which we have just demonstrated). 
However, not all participants found the CSs neutral to begin with (using Baeyens et al.’s 
1988, 1989a, 1990, 1992 criterion of ratings between ±20) which left two options: exclude 
their data (11 participants from the attention enhanced condition, 3 from the distracter 
aware condition, 5 from the distracter unaware condition, and 7 from the BSB control) or 
include CS neutrality (the initial ratings of the CSs) as a covariate within the analysis. To 
avoid data exclusion, CS neutrality was included as a covariate. 
Within each level of the type of US two stimuli were used (pictures of rabbits and a seal for 
positive USs, and a mutilated head and hand for the disliked ones), and each of these 
stimuli has a unique CS neutrality variable that needs to be covaried out. To achieve this, it 
was necessary to incorporate a variable called picture, which compares the two pictures 
within each type of US.  Therefore, the data were analysed with a three way 4 (group: 
attention-enhanced, distraction (contingency aware), distraction (contingency unaware) or 
BSB control) × 2 (US type: liked or disliked) × 2(picture: picture 1 or picture 2) ANOVA with 
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repeated measures on the last two variables, CS neutrality was a varying covariate for 
each CS and the change in evaluative responses (post-conditioning minus pre-conditioning) 
was the dependent variable.  
There were no significant main effects of US type, F(1,91) < 1, group, F(3, 91) = 2.39, 
stimulus, F(1, 91) < 1. All interactions involving the stimulus variable were non-significant 
also, showing that the picture used as particular CS had no effect on change in rating. 
The crucial group × US type interaction was significant, F(3, 91) = 4.94, indicating that the 
US type did affect changes in CS ratings, but these changes depended on the group to 
which participants belonged. Contrasts revealed a significant difference between N-L and 
N-D pairs in the attention enhanced group compared to the BSB control (CI.95 = –23.83 
(lower), –3.43 (upper), t = –3.26, r = .32), but not between the distracter (aware) and the 
BSB control (CI.95 = –9.67 (lower), 12.74 (upper), t < 1, r = .03) or the distractor 
(unaware) and the BSB control (CI.95 = –18.57 (lower), 11.06 (upper), t < 1, r = .06). 
Figure 1 shows the mean evaluative ratings of the CS at pre-conditioning and post-
conditioning dependent on the type of US with which they were paired and whether 
participants were part of the BSB control or were distracted and were aware or unaware of 
the contingencies. In the attention enhanced condition the valence of the CSs paired with 
positive USs increased and the ratings of CSs paired with negative USs decreased. 
However, in all other conditions these effects were not present.  
Insert Figure 1 
Per-Contingency Analysis 
As Field (2000, 2001a) has suggested, the analysis of awareness at a group level is 
problematic. Therefore, further analyses were conducted that included awareness at a per-
contingency level (that is analysing the data by assigning each contingency a covariate that 
specifies the level of awareness of that particular contingency). For each CS, two 
awareness variables could be calculated: a dichotomous dummy variable (aware or 
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unaware) or a continuous variable constructed from a combination of the correct response 
and the level of confidence in the response. For the strong and weak awareness measures, 
this continuous variable ranged from 0 (an incorrect response of which the participant was 
completely sure) to 7 (a correct response of which they were completely sure). The steps 
in between reflect varying degrees in confidence: 0 = incorrect and completely sure, 1 = 
incorrect and rather sure, 2 = incorrect and rather unsure, 3 incorrect and completely 
unsure, 4 = correct and completely unsure, 5 = correct and rather unsure, 6 = correct and 
rather sure, 7 = correct and completely sure. For the recognition measure, the continuous 
variable ranged from 0 (any combination of responses in which participants said they had 
not seen the actual pairing), through 1 (if they recognised or knew they had seen the 
actual pairings, but also recognised the decoy pairing) and 2 (they recognised the actual 
pairing and only had a feeling they had also seen the decoy pairing, or they had a feeling 
they had seen the actual pairing and reported not seeing the decoy pairing) to 3 (they 
recognised the actual pairing and reported that they hadn’t seen the decoy pairing).  
As before, the change in evaluative responses (post-conditioning minus pre-conditioning) 
were analysed. The analysis looked at the type of US used (liked or disliked) and, because 
within each of these levels two stimuli were used, another variable called picture was 
incorporated. The awareness measure could then be introduced as a covariate at each 
repeated level. Finally, a group variable was included (distraction task or no distraction 
task) and data from the BSB group were excluded (because this group would confound 
with contingency awareness because of the large amount of contingency awareness across 
experimental groups and the universal absence of contingency awareness in the control 
group because they experience no contingencies). The analyses were, therefore, a 2 (US 
type: liked or disliked) × 2 (picture: picture 1 or picture 2) × distracter (distracter task or 
not) ANCOVA with four covariates representing the awareness of each of the four 
contingencies. Initial CS ratings were also included as covariates (CS Neutrality). In this 
analysis a main effect of US type reflects a conditioning effect, and an interaction between 
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US type and distracter will indicate a different effect when a distracter task was not used. 
If awareness moderates the change in CS responses then this should show up as a 
significant covariate. The analysis was repeated using covariates based on the measures of 
awareness derived from the strong, weak and recognition awareness measures. The effect 
of US type was significant in all analysis yielding effect sizes of r = .38 (weak 
dichotomous), .37 (weak continuous), .37 (strong dichotomous), .36 (strong continuous), 
.35 (recognition dichotomous), and .34 (recognition continuous). These effect sizes are not 
significantly different using Hedges’ homogeneity of effect size test, χ2 = 0.087, p = 1 (see 
Field, 2001b for computational details). The US type effect significantly interacted with 
whether or not a distracter task was used in all cases, r (listed in the same order as above) 
= .38, .36, .41, .38, .41, and .40 (again these effect sizes are not significantly different, χ2 
= 0.17, p = 1). The covariate effect of awareness was non-significant in all analyses and 
yielded effect sizes of r (listed in the same order as above) = .19, .17, .18, .15, .17, and 
.16. In no analysis did the type of picture of CS neutrality have an effect. 
Discussion 
This study has two important findings: (1) evaluative conditioning effects could be found 
compared to non-paired control and these effects could not be prone to the artifact 
unearthed by Field and Davey (1999) and so reflect associative learning; and (2) 
distracting participants during conditioning eliminates conditioning effects.  
On the first of these findings, Field and Davey (1999) discovered that when CSs and USs 
are selected based on an individual participant’s subjective evaluation of them and are then 
paired based on perceptual similarity, evaluative-conditioning type effects are found even 
when participants see no conditioning trials. The conditioning-type effects were found to 
arise from an interaction between this stimulus selection procedure and participants 
tendency to engage in similarity-based category learning during the experiment. The 
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current experiment eliminates this possibility by using the same CSs and USs for all 
participants and counterbalancing them across groups. 
Given the controversy surrounding EC, these findings are very important because this 
study is one of the first to replicate the basic visual evaluative conditioning paradigm but 
with CSs and USs fully counterbalanced across participants1 (although counterbalanced 
designs have been used in EC experiments using tastes). Shanks & Dickinson (1990) have 
suggested that a paradigm in which CSs and USs are counterbalanced across participants is 
a good control for nonassociative effects because all CSs enter into associations with all 
USs and so observed effects cannot possibly be attributed to stimulus properties. Field and 
Davey (1997, 1998, 1999) have taken a slightly stronger view. Essentially they agree with 
Shanks and Dickinson but note that in autonomic paradigms some CSs are not paired with 
USs (so there is a discrimination between CSs that enter into associations and ones that do 
not). In EC studies this is typically not so because all CSs enter into associations with some 
form of US (be it liked, disliked or neutral). Field and Davey (1998), therefore, argue that a 
non-paired control (the BSB control) is a necessary additional control that allows 
comparison between CSs that enter into associations and those that do not. In terms of 
isolating cause and effect, this comparison of an association and no-association condition is 
necessary. As such, Experiment 1 has made important steps towards demonstrating EC 
using visual stimuli using a very strict methodology. 
The most striking result is that a distraction task eliminated conditioning. There are two 
explanations: (1) the distraction task interfered with contingency awareness resulting in a 
failure to condition, or (2) the distraction task does not prevent contingency awareness, 
but prevents conditioned responding. The former is supported by evidence from the 
autonomic conditioning literature suggesting that repetitive CS-US pairings do not produce 
                                          
1 Some studies in the visual domain have used random CS-UCS allocations (e.g. De 
Houwer et al., 2000), which reduces the possibility of artefacts, but fully counterbalancing 
eliminates any remote possibility that effects are stimulus-specific. 
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autonomic CRs when contingency awareness is prevented by using distracting masking 
tasks (Dawson, 1970; Dawson & Reardon, 1971; Dawson, Catania, Schell, & Grings, 
1979). Dawson and Schell (1982) showed that in individuals who could not shift attention 
from a distraction task (in one ear) to a previously conditioned CS (presented in the 
opposite ear) no conditioning effects were observed. Although in this study CS-US relations 
were learnt without a distracter task, the results show that engaging in dual-tasks 
interferes with conditioned responses by distracting attention from the conditioning task. 
However, this explanation is unlikely because the distraction task prevented awareness in 
only 1/3 of the participants. Also, participants aware of the contingencies who were 
distracted showed no evidence of conditioning. This suggests that distracting participants 
interfered with conditioning without necessarily reducing contingency awareness. 
A final possibility is that participants in the attention-enhanced condition were simply 
demand aware, whereas those in the distraction condition were not. For demand 
awareness to explain conditioned responding participants need to be aware of the 
contingencies and to have an expectation that the experimenter wants CS ratings to 
change in the direction of the US with which it was paired. Without contingency awareness, 
any expectation that CS ratings should change in the direction of the US cannot translate 
into behaviour because the participant does not know on which US to base the change. 
Therefore, to explain the current results would require an explanation of why the 
distraction task eliminated demand awareness in those participants who were contingency 
aware. Although it is not self-evident why demand awareness might have been present in 
the attention-enhanced group but not in the contingency aware distraction task group it, 
nevertheless, remains a possibility. One solution would be to reduce contingency 
awareness in both distracted and non-distracted participants: because then even if demand 
awareness survives, it cannot translate into responses without contingency awareness.      
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EXPERIMENT 2 
The exact role of contingency awareness and distraction were inseparable in Experiment 1 
because (1) non-distracted participants were always aware of contingencies, and relatively 
few distracted participants were unaware of the contingencies; (2) no baseline for the 
effects of distraction was available because BSB control participants did not engage in a 
distraction task; and (3) the spectre of demand awareness was not fully banished. 
Experiment 1 looked at EC under dual-task conditions, but did not make specific attempts 
to reduce contingency awareness. Experiment 2 aims to replicate the basic finding that 
dual-task performance inhibits EC, while dissociating these effects from those of 
contingency awareness. Specifically, attention will be manipulated, as before, by using 
distracter tasks for half of the experimental and control participants. However, each person 
will receive normal presentations of CS-US contingencies and presentations in which the US 
is rapidly presented. By manipulating the speed at which the US is presented  contingency 
awareness should be reduced without interfering with attention to the CS (and in models of 
associative learning it is the CSs that seem to vie for attentional resources). It is predicted 
that dual-task conditions will result in attenuated learning, whereas reduced contingency 
awareness will not. 
Participants 
One hundred and thirty one paid volunteers were used as participants (35 in the 
conditioning group with the distraction task and 32 in the other three groups) and were 
tested individually.  Their ages ranged from 18 to 53 years. All participants were students 
from various disciplines at Sussex University.  In the paired-distracter group, 10 were male 
and 25 female, with mean age of 21.91 (SD = 4.25). In the paired-no distracter group, 9 
were male and 23 female, with mean age of 25.03 (SD = 8.25). In the BSB-distracter 
group, 8 were male and 24 female, with mean age of 21.38 (SD = 4.10). In the BSB-no 
distracter group, 13 were male and 19 female, with mean age of 22.63 (SD = 5.25). 
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Stimuli 
The 50 colour pictures used in Experiment 1 were again used in this experiment. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus were the same as for Experiment 1 except that new software was written 
(ECAwarenessAttention version 1.0 by Field & Field, 2000).  
Procedure 
The procedure was, in essence, the same as that used in Experiment 1 except that within 
paired and BSB control groups half of the participants performed a distraction task during 
the acquisition stage. In addition, a within-participant manipulation of contingency 
awareness was achieved by using backward-masked fast-presented USs for half of the 
stimulus pairs (for convenience the pairings with masked USs will be referred to as 
subliminal pairs). 
Stage 1: Baseline Assessment (pre-conditioning) 
This stage was identical to that described for Experiment 1. 
Stage 2: Acquisition 
All participants viewed 10 semi-randomised presentations of 4 CS-US pairs: 2 × N-L 
pairings and 2 × N-D pairings. One N-L and one N-D pair had a backward-masked 
subliminal US, the remaining pairs had normal US presentations (with parameters identical 
to Experiment 1). As in Experiment 1, the four different CSs were counterbalanced across 
the four USs across participants, but in addition the decision of which pairings had 
backward-masked USs was also counterbalanced across participants. All combinations of 
CSs and USs and masking arrangements were used resulting in 16 different 
counterbalancing conditions. For normal pairings the presentation rates were identical to 
Experiment 1 (the US was presented for 1s), however, in the subliminal pairings the US 
and mask appeared over a 1s interval with the US occupying 1 refresh rate of the monitor 
(17ms approx.) of the interval and the mask occupying the remaining 983ms. It was 
important for the subliminal awareness check (see stage four) that each US had a unique 
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mask, therefore, 4 masks were constructed that consisted of a constant pattern of noise 
(random colour dots) that had either a green, blue, red or yellow filter. As such the masks 
had no recognisable features or similarity with the US that it masked. 
Participants were split into one of four groups: (1) Paired-No Distraction in which 
participants viewed contingent CS-US presentations as described in the previous 
experiment; (2) Paired-Distraction, which was the same but participants counted 
backwards from 300, aloud, in intervals of 3 for the duration of the stage; (3) BSB-No 
Distraction in which participants viewed CS and US block presentations as described in 
Experiment 1; and (4) BSB-Distraction, which was the same as the previous group but 
participants counted backwards as in the paired-distraction group. 
Stage 3: Postacquisition Assessment (post-conditioning) 
This stage was exactly as described for Experiment 1. 
Stage 4: Measurement of Contingency Awareness. 
Subliminal Awareness:To assess awareness of the pairings in which the US was masked, 
participants were shown each mask used (the order of presentation was randomised) and 
asked to ‘Think back to the second stage of the experiment when you were simply looking 
at images (but not rating them). Did you notice what image came IMMEDIATELY before the 
one above?’ Participants could respond yes or no. If responding positively they were asked 
‘What was the picture of?’ and ‘How did the picture make you feel?’ For each of these 
questions participants could type responses into a text box next to the question or click on 
a button labelled ‘Don’t Know’. A US was deemed to be undetected if participants answered 
no to the first question or incorrectly named the US picture or its valence. 
Recognition Awareness: In Experiment 1, the three awareness measures showed 
substantial correspondence (a meta-analysis of effect sizes from the different methods 
revealed considerable homogeneity); therefore, only one measure (the recognition 
measure) was used as a manipulation check in this experiment. This procedure was 
essentially the same as for Experiment 1 but with some subtle changes. Participants again 
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saw eight CS-US pairs in random order (four actual CS-US pairings and the same CSs 
accompanied by 4 decoy USs). In the previous experiments participants could conceivably 
discriminate real from decoy pairings on the basis of identifying US pictures they saw 
during stage two from those that they did not (remember the decoy USs were not from the 
conditioning stage). In this experiment the decoy US was always the US of the same 
valence that was not paired with that CS. All other aspects of this stage were the same as 
in Experiment 1 and a participant was again deemed aware of a given contingency if (1) 
they correctly recognised the actual contingency (either by indicating that they 
remembered seeing it, or had a feeling that they had seen it); (2) they correctly indicated 
that they did not see the relevant decoy pairing. 
Results 
All statistical tests used a cut-off point of p = 0.05 for significance and, where relevant, 
effect sizes are reported as Pearson’s r. 
Awareness Measures 
For the backward masked pairings 130 of 131 participants were deemed unaware (i.e. 
unaware on both the subliminal awareness and recognition awareness measures) of the N-
D pairing and 128 were unaware of the N-L pairing that they experienced. Therefore, in 
total 127 participants were unaware of the subliminal pairings. For the normal pairings we 
are interested only in the experimental group (because those in the control did not receive 
pairings and so could not be aware), of the 67 in the experimental group 51 were aware of 
the N-D pairing and 42 were aware of the N-L pairing.  
US Ratings 
The liked USs were rated positively in the paired-no distraction (M = 64.66, SE = 5.78), 
the paired-distraction (M = 63.29, SE = 5.44), BSB-no distraction (M = 48.19, SE = 5.98) 
and the BSB-distraction (M = 58.08, SE = 5.69). The disliked USs were rated very 
negatively in the paired-no distraction (M = –78.13, SE = 5.18), the paired-distraction (M 
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= –84.74, SE = 4.87), BSB-no distraction (M = –81.52, SE = 5.35) and the BSB-
distraction (M = –83.47, SE = 5.10). A three-way 2 (group: paired or BSB) × 2 (distract: 
distraction task or not) × 2 (US type: liked or disliked) ANOVA on the US ratings revealed a 
highly significant main effect of US type, F(1, 123) = 1059.32, r = .95 but no significant 
main effect of group, distract or any interactions. As such, liked USs were rated 
significantly more positively than disliked USs and that this was true across all conditions. 
CS Ratings 
Figure 2 shows the mean evaluative ratings of the CS at pre-conditioning and post-
conditioning dependent on the type of US with which they were paired, whether these 
pairings had a normal or subliminally-presented US, whether participants were part of the 
paired or BSB control groups and whether they were distracted or not. In the distracted 
conditions there were no substantial changes to any of the CS ratings in either the paired 
or BSB groups. However, in the non-distracted groups a differential shifts in CS ratings 
across the type of US were observed in the paired group but not the BSB control.  
Insert Figure 2 
The change in CS ratings (post-conditioning ratings minus pre-conditioning ratings) were 
analysed using a four way 2 (group: paired or BSB control) × 2 (distraction: distraction 
task or not) × 2 (US type: liked or disliked) × 2(US speed: Subliminal or normal) mixed 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two variables. The initial rating of the CS (CS 
neutrality) was entered as a varying covariate for each of the CSs, as was awareness of the 
contingency into which a particular CS entered (as measured by the recognition measure). 
As such, this analysis takes into account per-contingency awareness, and CS neutrality. 
Rather than list all of the effects from this analysis, all main effects and interactions were 
nonsignificant unless otherwise stated. To demonstrate a basic conditioning effect CS 
ratings should change across time depending on the type of US with which it was paired 
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(US type) and whether the CS and US were paired or not (group). Therefore, the 
dependent variable (the change in CS ratings) should be affected by the group × US type 
interaction and any higher-order interactions involving this term. The group × US type 
interaction was significant, F(1, 125) = 6.15, r = .22. Distraction seemed to moderate this 
effect though as shown by a significant group × US type × distraction interaction, F(1, 122) 
= 7.08, r = .23. The final issue is whether US speed had any effect. The group × distracter 
× US type × US speed was non-significant, F(1, 125) < 1, r = .06. This indicates that the 
three way interaction results described above were not influenced by the speed of US 
presentation. The CS neutrality and contingency awareness regression terms were non-
significant throughout this analysis. 
To break down the group × distracter × US type interaction, two way 2 (group: paired or 
BSB) × 2 (US type: liked or disliked) mixed ANOVAs with repeated measures on the later 
variable were conducted separately for distracted and non-distracted groups and within 
these groups for normal and subliminal pairings. In all four analyses, the change in CS 
ratings was the outcome and CS neutrality and per-contingency awareness were entered 
as varying covariates for each CS. The crucial effect in each analysis is the group × US type 
interaction. For the distracted groups, this interaction was non-significant for normal pairs, 
F(1, 63) < 1, r = .12, and subliminal pairs, F(1, 63) < 1, r = .02. In the non-distracted 
groups, the group × US type interaction was significant for the normal pairings, F(1, 60) = 
4.06, r = .25. Specifically, the effect of US type was significant in the paired, F(1, 60) = 
7.23, r = .33, but not the BSB group, F(1, 60) < 1, r = .01. Also in the non-distracted 
groups, the group × US type interaction was significant for the subliminal pairings, F(1, 60) 
= 4.55, r = .27. Specifically, the effect of US type was significant in the paired group, F(1, 
60) = 4.35, r = .26, but not in the BSB control, F(1, 60) = 1.09, r = .13. 
Figure 3 illustrates the dissociation between conditioning and awareness by plotting the 
size of the conditioning effect (changes in N-D and N-L pairings in experimental groups 
compared to the controls), and the percentage of participants aware of the contingencies 
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for distracted and non-distracted participants, when USs were presented normally (un-
shaded bars and circles) and subliminally (shaded bars and triangles). A clear dissociation 
emerges: when No Distraction Task was used, conditioning occurred as indexed by medium 
effect sizes) regardless of whether Subliminal/Normal pairs were used, and 
correspondingly, regardless of whether contingency awareness was extremely low or high. 
When Distraction was used, no conditioning occurred, regardless of whether contingency 
awareness was extremely low or intermediate/high. 
Insert Figure 3 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 sought to dissociate the effects of awareness from the effects of distraction. 
The results demonstrated three very important points: (a) differential conditioning could be 
observed compared to an unpaired control condition; (b) this conditioning was eliminated 
by a distraction task, (c) the effect of distraction could not be explained by a reduction in 
contingency awareness. 
One concern that could be raised with the data from Experiment 2 is that pre-conditioning 
ratings were sometimes quite different across conditions. In particular, one possible 
explanation of the observed effects when masked USs were used and there was no 
distraction task (top right panel of Figure 2) is that exposure to these stimuli during 
conditioning merely exaggerated the pre-conditioning ratings in a particular direction: 
when the pre-conditioning ratings were negative, exposure made them more negative and 
when pre-conditioning ratings were positive exposure make them more positive. This would 
be rather like the artifactual process found by Field & Davey (1999). There are several 
reasons why this explanation is unlikely. The most important point is that CSs were fully 
counterbalanced across USs. This is important because it makes it improbably that the 
effects were a product of a particular stimulus interacting with exposure effects (see 
Shanks & Dickinson, 1990). In addition, in Figure 2, all pre-conditioning ratings (16 in 
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total) reflect averaged ratings of the same 4 CSs, and across conditions similar levels of 
pre-conditioning ratings can bee seen to give rise to both positive and negative changes in 
ratings. Furthermore, the fact that CS neutrality did not feature as a significant variable in 
any analysis also suggests that these differences in baseline ratings were not responsible 
for the observed effects (remember that the effects observed controlled for CS neutrality). 
However, to further investigate this possibility statistically pre-conditioning ratings for trials 
involving ‘subliminal’ USs and no distraction task were correlated with the change in 
evaluative ratings. If the explanation above is correct then high pre-conditioning ratings 
should create positive changes in evaluative ratings, and negative pre-conditioning ratings 
should create negative shifts in evaluative ratings. In short, a positive correlation should be 
observed. In fact, pre-conditioning ratings had a negative relationship with changes in 
evaluative ratings (r = –.34). If pre-conditioning ratings were contributing to the pattern of 
observed results (rather than the association into which a CS enters) then this would 
predict the exact opposite to the pattern of results shown in the top right panel of Figure 2 
(if preconditioning ratings are above zero then ratings should fall, and if preconditioning 
ratings are below zero then they should rise). Nevertheless, these differences in baseline 
ratings across groups illustrate how difficult it is to find universally neutral stimuli. 
Others might also suppose that demand awareness had a role to play in Experiment 2. 
However, for this to be true, it would be necessary to assume that the absence of 
contingency awareness did not imply the absence of demand awareness. The rationale for 
this second experiment was partly based on the idea that this cannot be the case. Although 
it is, of course, possible for participants to be aware that their ratings of CSs are expected 
to change, and that these changes depend upon the liked and disliked images that they 
have seen, without knowledge of which CS was paired with which US it is not so easy to 
imagine how this demand awareness would translate into behaviour. For demand 
awareness to explain these results, participants would have to know, at the very least, the 
valence of the US paired with a given CS. Given that when USs were rapidly presented the 
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vast majority of participants could not identify them, this greatly reduces the credibility of 
a demand awareness explanation (at least for these pairings). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The main finding in these experiments is that distraction has an effect on conditioning 
independent of contingency awareness. One obvious explanation of this finding is in terms 
of attentional resources being drawn away from the conditioning procedure. Kahneman 
(1973) has suggested that humans have limited attentional resources that are divided 
between tasks, as such, difficult tasks will consume the most attentional resources, and 
interference on difficult tasks will be less than on easy tasks (Zelniker, 1971). Pashler and 
colleagues have shown that when two tasks require different responses task performance 
will be limited because responses to both tasks are fighting for limited memory retrieval 
capacity (Pashler, 1990; Fagot & Pashler, 1992; Carrier & Pashler, 1995). Related to this 
evidence, studies on the psychological refractory period suggest that there is a 
fundamental limit on the performance on concurrent tasks such that if the first task is 
occupying a central processing mechanism, then the second task will be put on hold (see 
Styles, 1997 for a review). 
The role of attention in models of associative learning (e.g. Rescorla-Wagner, 1972 and 
Mackintosh, 1975) can be easily extended to fit the evaluative conditioning effects in 
Experiments 1 and 2: participants may have found the distraction task (counting 
backwards) more cognitively demanding than watching the CS-US pairings. As a 
consequence, the limited attentional resources of these individuals may have been 
allocated to the counting task (the primary task) leaving few (if any) attentional resources 
for the processing of the emotional content of the CSs and USs. In Zelniker’s (1971) terms, 
the greater distraction was observed on the easier task. In terms of Mackintosh’s and 
Kruschke’s formalizations of associative learning, this reduced attention would have an 
impact on the association weights of the CSs in these experiments. 
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However, the picture is probably more complex than this, because in both Experiments 1 
and 2, contingency awareness remained relatively unaffected by distraction; therefore, 
attention clearly was being paid to the CS-US contingencies at some level. Therefore, it is 
not simply the case that participants ignored all of the CSs and USs because their attention 
was focussed on the distraction task. One clue to what could be happening comes from 
recent findings from Katkin, Weins and Öhman (2001) that ‘gut-feelings’ to emotional 
stimuli may be based primarily on the perception of internal cues (such as heart beats). 
Katkin et al. found that when an aversive US was used learning was best predicted by an 
ability to sense internal cues. Evaluative responses are based on such gut-feelings (at least 
in terms of how they are operationalised in evaluative conditioning experiments), and so 
may be moderated by individuals’ abilities to sense internal responses to the experimental 
stimuli. As such, the distraction task in Experiments 1 and 2 may not have distracted 
participants from the stimuli per se (as indicated by the failure to reduce contingency 
awareness), but may have distracted them from processing the emotional content of these 
pictures by preventing them from paying attention to visceral cues. Of course, this 
explanation is tentative, but future work might look to explore the role of visceral cues in 
evaluative conditioning. Interestingly, one study using haptic stimuli did show conditioning 
effects relative to a BSB control when a very similar distracter task to the one employed in 
the current studies was used to inhibit contingency awareness (Hammerl & Grabitz, 2000). 
The difference between the current finding and theirs probably lies in the modality of the 
task. Hirst, Spelke, Reaves, Caharack and Neisser (1980) have shown that dual processing 
is possible and in Hammerl and Grabitz participants the CS-US pairings, and the visceral 
cues they elicit, may simply have been more attention grabbing than in the current study 
(because they elicited a sensation on the skin). However, this does not explain why 
Hammerl and Grabitz only found EC when a distracter task was used. 
A final consideration is what these results tell us at a process level and the implications for 
EC’s status as a unique form of Pavlovian conditioning. In general terms, the results have 
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some interesting implications for process models of associative learning such as those 
discussed by Lovibond and Shanks (2002). Lovibond and Shanks make the point that 
contingency awareness is interesting at a theoretical level because it may allow researchers 
to discount certain models of learning. In particular they make two quite strong predictions 
about a single process model: (1) this model predicts a close correspondence between 
awareness and the production of a CR; and (2) an adequate demonstration of conditioning 
without contingency awareness falsifies the single process model because contingency 
awareness is assumed to directly cause the CR. They go on to suggest that in a single 
process model a dissociation between conditioning and contingency awareness is unlikely 
to result from measurement error and so is the most theoretically interesting of the 
models. Although Lovibond and Shanks’ logic is impeccable, they place the relationship 
between contingency awareness and conditioned responding in a vacuum. That is, they 
assume that other factors could not moderate the relationship between awareness and 
conditioned responding. The experiments presented in this paper shows that attention 
affected both contingency awareness (to some degree) and conditioned responding. This 
demonstrates how a single causal connection between awareness and learning could be 
moderated by some external factor. This perhaps suggests that a single process model is 
an overly simplistic view of associative processes, and that conditioning without awareness 
does not rule out such a process (because a single causal link may exist between 
conditioning and learning, but both are also influenced by other factors that are not part of 
a second process). Interestingly, the eventuality of external influences on learning and 
awareness opens up many possibilities for explaining the mass of conflicting evidence for 
the relationship between contingency awareness and conditioning, especially in evaluative 
conditioning (Field, 2001a). 
Nevertheless, although the finding that conditioning effects did not seem to depend upon 
contingency awareness lends further support to the idea that evaluative conditioning is 
both associative and can occur without contingency awareness, these results need to be 
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treated cautiously. Although these experiments attempted to account for contingency 
awareness at a per-contingency level, the data highlight the many problems faced by 
researchers trying to answer questions about awareness. For example, participants will 
never be aware or unaware of all contingencies, if only because of the degrees of error 
inherent in measuring awareness. As Shanks and St. John (1994) point out, measures 
need to be relevant to the conditioning effect, should assess awareness at the same time 
as conditioned responses, and should be comparably sensitive to measures of the 
conditioned response. The current experiments measured contingency awareness after 
evaluative responses were recorded, and even with a variety of measures it’s unclear 
whether their sensitivity is comparable to that of the measures of conditioning. As such, no 
strong claims should be made about the role of contingency awareness.





Stimulus Type Image IAPS Number 
IAPS Pleasure 
Rating2 
CS (Neutral) Mug 7009 4.93 
CS (Neutral) Mushroom 5532 5.19 
CS (Neutral) Filing Cabinet 7225 4.45 
CS (Neutral) Tissues 7950 4.95 
US (Positive) Seal Pup 1440 8.19 
US (Positive) Puppies 1710 8.34 
US (Negative) Mutilated Hand 9405 1.83 
US (Negative) Mutilated Head 3010 1.79 
 
                                          
2 IAPS ratings range from 1 (unpleasant) to 9 (pleasant), with 5 representing neutral. 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
 
Figure 1 Graph showing the mean CS ratings (and SE) pre- and post-conditioning for liked, 
disliked and no USs according to whether participants were in the attention 
enhanced (contingency aware), distracted (contingency unaware and aware) or in 
the BSB control. 
Figure 2 Graph showing the mean CS ratings (and SE) pre- and post-conditioning for liked, 
disliked and no USs according to whether stimuli were paired of unpaired (BSB), 
had backward masked subliminal USs, and participants were distracted or not 
during conditioning. 
Figure 3: Graph showing the percentage of participants aware of contingencies (bars) and the 
size of the conditioning effect, r (lines), when distracted or not and when USs were 
presented normally (not shaded bars and circles) or subliminally (shaded bars and 
triangles). 










































































Paired BSB Paired BSB


























Paired BSB Paired BSB
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Normal Pairings Subliminal UCS






























































 Evaluative Conditioning Page 38 
REFERENCES 
Baeyens, F., Crombez, G., Van den Bergh, O., & Eelen, P. (1988). Once in contact always in 
contact: evaluative conditioning is resistant to extinction. Advances in Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 10, 179–199. 
Baeyens, F., & De Houwer, J. (1995). Evaluative conditioning is a qualitatively distinct form of 
classical conditioning: a reply to Davey (1994). Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 
825–831. 
Baeyens, F., Eelen, P., & Crombez, G. (1995). Pavlovian associations are forever: On classical 
conditioning and extinction. Journal of Psychophysiology, 9, 127–141. 
Baeyens, F., Eelen, P., Crombez, G., & Van den Bergh, O. (1992). Human evaluative 
conditioning; acquisition trials, presentation schedule, evaluative style and contingency 
awareness. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 30, 133–142. 
Baeyens, F., Eelen, P., & Van den Bergh, O. (1990). Contingency awareness in evaluative 
conditioning: a case for unaware affective-evaluative learning. Cognition and Emotion, 4, 
3–18. 
Baeyens, F., Eelen, P., Van den Bergh, O., & Crombez, G. (1989). Acquired affective evaluative 
value: Conservative but not unchangeable. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 27, 279–
287. 
Carrier, L. M., & Pashler, H. (1995). Attentional limits in memory retrieval.  Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 21, 1339–1348. 
Davey, G. C. L. (1994). Is evaluative conditioning a qualitatively distinct from of classical 
conditioning? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32, 291–299. 
Dawson, M. E. (1970). Cognition and conditioning: effects of masking the CS-US contingency 
on human GSR classical conditioning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 85, 389–396. 
Dawson, M. E., Catania, J. J., Schell, A. M., & Grings, W. W. (1979). Autonomic classicial 
conditioning as a function of awareness of stimulus contingencies. Biological Psychology, 
9, 23–40. 
Dawson, M. E., & Reardon, D. P. (1973). Construct validity of recall and recognition 
postconditioning measures of awareness. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 98, 308–
315. 
Dawson, M. E., & Schell, A. M. (1982). Electrodermal responses to attended and nonattended 
significant stimuli during dichotic listening. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 8, 315–324. 
De Houwer, J., Baeyens, F., Vansteenwegen, D., & Eelen, P. (2000). Evaluative Conditioning in 
the picture-picture paradigm with random assignment of conditioned stimuli to 
 Evaluative Conditioning Page 39 
unconditioned stimuli. Journal of Experimental psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 
26 (2), 237–242. 
De Houwer, J., Thomas, S., & Baeyens, F. (2001). Associative learning of likes and dislikes: a 
review of 25 years of research on human evaluative conditioning. Psychological Bulletin, 
126, 853–869. 
Diaz, E., Ruiz, G., & Baeyens, F. (in press). Resistance to extinction of human evaluative 
conditioning using a between-subjects design. Cognition and Emotion. 
Fagot, C., & Pashler, H. (1994). Repetition blindness: perception of memory failure? Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 21, 275–292. 
Field, A. P. (1996). An appropriate control condition for evaluative conditioning. (Cognitive 
Science Research Paper No. 431). Brighton, UK: University of Sussex, School of Cognitive 
and Computing Science. 
Field, A. P. (1997). Re-evaluating evaluative conditioning. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. 
Field, A. P. (2000). I like it, but I’m not sure why: can evaluative conditioning occur without 
conscious awareness? Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 13–36. 
Field, A. P. (2001a). When all is still concealed: are we closer to understanding the 
mechanisms underlying evaluative conditioning? Consciousness and Cognition, 10, 559–
566. 
Field, A. P. (2001b). Meta-analysis of correlation coefficients: a Monte Carlo comparison of 
fixed- and random-effects methods. Psychological Methods, 6 (2), 161–180. 
Field, A. P. (2003). I don’t like it because it eats Brussels sprouts: Evaluative 
conditioning in children.  British Psychological Society Annual Conference, 
Bournemouth (13th –15th March, 2003). 
Field, A. P., & Davey, G. C. L. (1997). Conceptual conditioning: Evidence for an artifactual 
account of evaluative learning. Learning and Motivation, 28, 446–464. 
Field, A. P., & Davey, G. C. L. (1998). Evaluative conditioning: arte-fact or -fiction? — a reply 
to Baeyens, De Houwer, Vansteenwegen & Eelen (1998). Learning and Motivation, 29, 
475–491. 
Field, A. P. & Davey, G. C. L. (1999). Reevaluating evaluative conditioning: A nonassociative 
explanation of conditioning effects in the visual evaluative conditioning paradigm. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 25, 211–224. 
Field, A. P., & Field, P. D. (2000). ECAwarenessAttention version 1.0 for Windows™ [Computer 
program]. Brighton: Authors. 
Field, A. P., Lascelles, K. R. R., & Davey, G. C. L. (2003). Evaluative conditioning: missing 
presumed dead. Manuscript Under Review. 
 Evaluative Conditioning Page 40 
Fulcher, E. P., & Cocks, R. P. (1997). Dissociative storage systems in human evaluative 
conditioning. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35 (1), 1–10. 
Hammerl, M., & Grabitz, H.-J. (1993). Human evaluative conditioning: Order of stimulus 
presentation. Integrative Physiological and Behavioural Science, 28, 191–194. 
Hammerl, M., & Grabitz, H.-J. (2000). Affective-evaluative learning in humans: a form of 
associative learning or only an artifact? Learning and Motivation, 31, 345–363. 
Hirst, W., Spelke, E. S.,  Reaves, C. C.,  Caharack, G., & Neisser, U. (1980). Dividing attention 
without alternation or automaticity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 109, 
98–117. 
Kahneman, D. (1973) Attention and effort. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice all. 
Kamin, L. J. (1969). Predictability, surprise, attention and conditioning. In B. A. Campbell & R. 
M. Church (Eds.), Punishment and aversive behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Croft. 
Katkin, E. S., Wiens, S. & Öhman, A. (2001). Nonconscious fear conditioning, visceral 
perception, and the development of gut feelings. Psychological Science, 12, 366–370. 
Kruschke, J. K. (2001). Toward a unified model of attention in associative learning. Journal of 
Mathematical Psychology, 45, 812–863. 
Kruschke, J. K. & Blair, N. J. (2000). Blocking and backward blocking involve learned 
inattention. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 7, 636–645. 
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M. & Cuthbert, B. N. (1997a). International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS) [CD-Rom]. Florida: NIMH Center for Emotion and Attention (CSEA). 
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M. & Cuthbert, B. N. (1997b). International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS): Technical Manual and Affective Ratings. Florida: NIMH Center for Emotion and 
Attention (CSEA). 
Lovibond, P. F., & Shanks, D. R. (2002). The role of awareness in Pavlovian conditioning: 
empirical evidence and theoretical implications. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Animal behaviour Processes, 28, 3–26. 
Lubow, R. E. & Gerwitz, J. C. (1995). Latent inhibition in humans: data, theory and 
implications for schizophrenia. Psychological Bulletin,  117, 87–103. 
Mackintosh, N. J. (1975). A theory of attention: variations in the associability of stimuli with 
reinforcement. Psychological Review, 82, 276–298. 
Nissen, M. J., & Bullemer, P. (1987). Attentional requirements of learning: evidence from 
performance measures. Cognitive Psychology, 19, 1–32. 
Pashler, H. (1990). Do response modality effects support multi-processor models of divided 
attention? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 16, 
826–842. 
Reber, P. J., & Squire, L. R. (1994). Parallel brain systems for learning with and without 
awareness. Learning and Memory, 1, 217–229. 
 Evaluative Conditioning Page 41 
Reber, P. J., & Squire, L. R. (1998). Encapsulation of implicit and explicit memory in sequence 
learning. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 248–263. 
Rescorla, R. A. & Wagner, A. R. (1972). A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: variations in the 
effectiveness of reinforcement and non-reinforcement. In A. H. Blake & W. F. Prokasy 
(Eds.), Classical conditioning II: Current research and theory. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts. 
Rozin, P., Wrzesniewski, A., & Byrnes, D. (1998). The elusiveness of evaluative conditioning. 
Learning and Motivation, 29, 397–415. 
Shanks, D. R., & Dickinson, A. (1990). Contingency awareness in evaluative conditioning: A 
comment on Baeyens, Eelen and van den Bergh. Cognition and Emotion, 4, 19–30. 
Shanks, D. R., & St. John, M. F. (1994). Characteristics of dissociable human learning systems. 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 17, 367–447. 
Shanks, D. R., & Channon, S. (2002). Effects of a secondary task on ‘implicit’ sequence 
learning: learning or performance? Psychological Research, 66, 99–109. 
Stevens, A., Lascelles, K., Field, A. P., Matthias, R., Siddens-Corby, R., & Ives, R. (1999). 
ECtests version 1.2 for Windows™ [Computer program]. Brighton: University of Sussex. 
Stevenson, R. J., Boakes, R. A., & Wilson, J. P. (2000). Resistance to extinction of conditioned 
odor perceptions: evaluative conditioning is not unique. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 26, 423–440. 
Styles, E. A. (1997). The psychology of attention. Hove, UK: Psychology Press. 
Zelniker, T. (1971). Perceptual attenuation of an irrelevant auditory verbal input as measured 
by an involuntary verbal response in a selective-attention task. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 87, 52-56. 
